# AFF ANSWERS

### Perm

#### **Perm do both -**

De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP\_20211203\_nato\_eu\_cooperation\_demaio.pdf. Accessed 6-24-2022](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf.%20Accessed%206-24-2022); MJen]

In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards.

#### The perm shields the link to the China tradeoff DA

De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP\_20211203\_nato\_eu\_cooperation\_demaio.pdf. Accessed 6-24-2022](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf.%20Accessed%206-24-2022); MJen]

First, the EU could be a valuable partner for the U.S. and NATO in this theater given its growing economic and regulatory power, especially related to fair-trade practices and human rights protection. Second, NATO could help promote standards and interoperability (for example, through procurement coordination between NATO and the EU as described earlier). Increased interoperability not just through NATO but also EU forces could help to quickly mobilize forces in case of conflict, as well as serve as a deterrent regarding China. The EU could also offer support through its European Peace Facility, designed to provide assistance to partner countries to increase their security and defense capabilities.83 However, regardless of the type of assistance provided, without clear rules for standardization and convergent strategies for procurement and military strengthening, the two organizations (and their member states) risk competing with one another for strategic and market advantages.

### NATO-EU Coop Fails

#### Technical impracticalities between EU states and ideological divergences mean EU-NATO cooperation fail.

Akturan et al 18, EUChicago, (Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon, “”, The University of Chicago’s Chapter for European Horizons, <https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

[Edited] for ableist langauge

However, the difference in how commitment to respective sets of values is executed in NATO and EU results with a wide portfolio of cooperational problems, ranging from bureaucratic to strategic, despite their intention to work together. Could there be comprehensive and mutually respectful cooperation between the two organizations on security issues? Would this cooperation be wearproof given the bilateral conflicts brought up by non-joint members, such as in the Cyprus dilemma? This article surveys how bilateral and regional conflicts challenge the international resolve for transatlantic security cooperation, in which NATO and EU share common milito-political interest. The European Common Security and Defense Policy: Boon or Bane The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), known before 2009’s Lisbon Treaty as the European Security and Defence Policy, represented the apex of security cooperation among European Union member states and the EU’s undertaking of a heavier defence role along with NATO. The CSDP seeks to exercise European military independence from NATO within five areas: the self-assured security of the EU, a closer relationship between eastern and western Europe, structural improvement in European conflict management, cooperation between neighboring regions, and pioneering global governance of conflicts. To implement these priorities into pre-existing European structural mechanisms, the EU’s civilian-military status has undergone an updating process. For instance, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created through the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, which made the EU constitutional laws legally binding and further centralized the Union. The Lisbon Treaty also sought to address the independent methods in which the EU member states were answering international crises. When EEAS was launched in December 2010 as an EU department with the express function of consolidating EU responses to international security issues as an autonomous unit, it actualized CSDP’s vision for a new European crisis management strategy which technically compelled member states to cooperate in situations of security threats, in or out of the EU. Initiatives similar to EAAS make clear what the EU lacks has not been the incentive to incorporate an international security dimension to its agenda, but the technical practicality to implement decisions to that end in a unified manner. Although common goals had been set for NATO-EU cooperation through the Berlin Plus Agreements in 2003 before CSDP, creation of a unified transatlantic defence and security policy between the two entities has encountered ample executive difficulties. For instance, Cyprus – an EU but not NATO member- was excluded from joint EU-NATO meetings by Turkey – a NATO but not EU member- due to the decades long political antagonism over the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974. Even this seemingly inconsequential bilateral problem was enough to [halt]~~paralyze~~ the NATO-EU cooperation, making some organizational details of Berlin Plus Agreement impossible. Berlin Agreement’s decision to create a merged NATO-EU headquarters in Brussels to manage conflicts in which both the EU and NATO have common interests has not helped reduce the fracture between American and European politics. For instance, when France and Germany coordinated a joint gathering with Belgium and Luxembourg to protest the British-American invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, NATO and then American government denounced it as “Chocolate Summit,” betraying the spirit of cooperation aimed by CSDP. Joint NATO-EU missions for stabilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, in Dafur, Sudan, as an assistance to African Union or in Somali to combat piracy are, however, some successful products of Berlin Plus Agreements. These joint undertakings are cases in which not all the EU or NATO members were interested in intervention, but they were made possible by sharing of military expertise and assets from either of the parties, mostly by NATO. However, post-colonial Africa and Western Balkans are regions over which NATO and EU do not have strong strategic disagreements. Despite Berlin Plus, EU has been critical of NATO’s call for joint missions in Afghanistan for instance and only supported the civilian projects of current Resolute Support Mission of NATO. Bilateral hurdles in front of NATO-EU cooperation such as Cyprus Dispute are hence not the actual root causes hindering the constructive attitude of Berlin Plus. As Europe’s disapproval of Iraqi invasion or reluctance of cooperation in Afghanistan demonstrates, the CSDP cannot overcome the strategic divergence of NATO and EU in issues of incompatible political interests. Ideological divergence of the two partners should be reconciled before the region specific problems are addressed by calls for joint military actions. The new and more NATO-conscious level of ambition for CSDP thus required European member states to invest more in security and defence, both politically and economic. Perhaps an important undertaking was revisiting Berlin Plus Agreement’s comfort in EU utilizing NATO asset and capabilities when necessary, instead initiating more EU-focused solutions like EAAS. With the attenuation of this cooperative ethos in both sides, there is a present risk that NATO and the EU will begin to compete for limited military resources, straying from the envisioned Berlin Plus Agreement. Lack of a coherent strategy among Western partners could prevent efficient response to crises, which does not bode well in a time of humanitarian atrocities — whether it be in Syria, Yemen, or South Sudan.

#### NATO-EU coop fails-- unresolved Cyprus-Turkey conflict and opposing institutional goals leave all projects in a deadlock.

Raik and Järvenpää ’17 (Dr Kristi Raik is the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at ICDS since February 2018. She is also an Adjunct Professor at the University of Turku. Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, a former Finnish diplomat and a senior government official, joined International Centre for Defence and Security on 1 May 2013. As a Senior Research Fellow at ICDS, he focuses on the security of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region and on issues related to NATO, the EU and transatlantic cooperation, as well as on the security and development of Afghanistan. “A New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation How to Make the Best of a Marriage of Necessity,” International Centre for Defense and Security, May 2017, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_A_New_Era_of_EU-NATO.pdf)-> HL

In spite of the promising start that created a solid framework for cooperation, by the early 2010s the EU-NATO relationship had produced very limited tangible results and was mired in structural obstacles. The main impediments, especially at the operational level, were created by the standoff between Cyprus and Turkey over the unresolved conflict on Cyprus. Furthermore, there was a tendency on both sides to see the relationship between NATO and the CSDP in terms of competition – even as a zero-sum game – which obviously did not encourage cooperation.21 Since its accession to the EU in 2004, Cyprus has put brakes on Turkey’s accession negotiations and blocked its participation in EUled missions, membership of the EDA and generally a more active role in CSDP. At the same time, Turkey has been able to block the use of NATO capabilities and assets by the EU and has not allowed the participation of the Republic of Cyprus, which it does not recognise, at formal EU-NATO meetings. Hence, meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the PSC have been held rarely (the latest took place in September 2015) and with a narrow agenda.22 This deadlock practically turned the Berlin Plus arrangements into a dead letter and 21. Drozdiak 2010. It should also be said that the Americans were not at that point particularly helpful. 22. In the 18 months to August 2015, four PSC-NAC meetings were organised: one formal meeting on EUFOR Operation Althea, two informal meetings on Ukraine, and one informal meeting on the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. See Dakic 2015. prevented more ambitious strategic cooperation. Berlin Plus arrangements have been used only for two operations: Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which ended in September 2003, and EUFOR Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an operation deployed since 2004. While formal cooperation was limited, in practice a division of labour in crisis management took shape, roughly along the lines of soft/civilian and hard/military security. Although the CSDP was created to carry out both civilian and military crisis management tasks, the EU did not become the preferred instrument for more ambitious military operations. Member states limited the use of CSDP to softer, non-combat operations, whereas NATO took care of militarily more demanding environments and combat tasks. This division was evident in the two locations where both organisations had an operation running simultaneously: Kosovo and Afghanistan. Staff-level cooperation between the missions on the ground worked reasonably well, thanks to individual efforts to find flexible and creative ways to work around the formal obstacles.23 It was also a setback to the CSDP that EU Battlegroups were never deployed due to the lack of political will to actually use this new tool. One of the hurdles was the reluctance of member states to finance their deployment. As of today, discussions on improved usability and more effective financing of the Battlegroups continue, but the issue has been pushed down the list of priorities by new, more promising areas of defence cooperation, to be described below. Apart from the structural hurdles, the EU side was simply not very interested in close cooperation. The EU nurtured an ambition to be a different kind of international actor, described as a civilian, normative, ethical or soft power.24 This aspiration favoured taking a step back from NATO, characterised by many as a relic of the Cold War that was struggling to find a new purpose.25

#### Bureaucratic procedures, misalignments, and overlap tank coordination.

Soare 21, Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies”, German Marshall Fund, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies)

The Biden administration also provides a window of opportunity to progress and be ambitious in broadening and regularizing NATO-EU cooperation in the field of innovation and EDTs. While political dialogue among their leadership has been steadily increasing over the past five years, the EU and NATO have consulted on their respective EDTs agendas only twice. Furthermore, bureaucratic procedures and misalignments sometimes frustrate even staff-to-staff cooperation in this area. The EU and increasingly NATO are proliferating agencies that conduct work on innovation in EDTs, including in security and defense. This makes it challenging to achieve internal coherence of activities within one organization, let alone coordinating agendas between the two.

#### It fails – duplicity, internal divisions, and empirics.

ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why\_an\_eu\_army\_is\_a\_bad\_idea\_we\_dont\_need\_a\_political\_bloc\_of\_the\_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure? Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…” At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.

### EU Weak

#### EU initiatives fail and they’re too weak – this is the 1nc author!

De Maio ’21 (Giovanna was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December 2021, Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf>)

Yet NATO-EU cooperation remains somewhat limited because of political tensions between member states (which hinders intelligence sharing) as well as weak European military capabilities and inadequate defense spending. Over the past few years the EU has made important progress in this domain through the establishment of the European Defense Fund and several defense projects under the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. Yet, according to several studies in the field, the state of European defense appears insufficient to tackle more serious military threats or to enable the EU to take initiatives in its neighborhood independently from the United States. In its “Strategic Compass” to be published in March 2022, the EU is supposed to adopt a bolder approach to its defense capabilities. In parallel, in a new strategic concept to be released in June 2022, NATO is supposed to tackle security throughout a widened angle, looking at domains that are not strictly defense-related.

#### EU doesn’t have the expertise

Lawrence and Cordy 20, \*Christie Lawrence is a Director for Research and Analysis working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property. Prior, she worked at Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant. She holds a B.A. in Public Policy from Duke University and is a concurrent MPP/JD candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School. \*\* Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. Koichiro Komiyama – Director, Global Coordination Division, JPCERT/CC, (Christie and Sean, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-intelligence)

The European Union’s Juncker 26 Commission (2014-2019) actively avoided regulating AI, causing the European Parliament to increase their efforts as a proactive voice in favor of stronger AI regulation. However, since the beginning of Ursula von der Leyen’s tenure, the Commission has initiated efforts to adopt stronger regulation for AI applications (i.e., differentiating regulation of AI based on defined “high-risk” and “low-risk” sectors”) and associated data spaces.27,28 These legislative proposals and their associated discussions are planned to be completed by the end of 2020. During the strategic planning and budgeting process of its R&D programs, the EU committed to providing at least EUR10.7 billion29 for AI-related research conducted between 2021 and 2027.30 Despite these financial and political efforts, the EU still remains technologically dependent on the US and China and suffers from a lack of capital and private funding, decentralized and uncoordinated AI expertise, severe brain drain (including to the US), and slow adoption of AI programming in its education and public sectors.

#### Only the US can do security cooperation with NATO on AI---EU is far behind on funding, adoption, and private investment.

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Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020).

### No Cyber Solvency

#### The EU will seek commercial advantages on AI which undermines broader cooperation.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/#why-work-together-disagreements-and-shared-goals>)

The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness.

### No NB

#### NB is non-unique – Squo solves EU autonomy---E12 and NORDEFCO.

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In addition to these overarching EU initiatives, a number of separate bi- and multi-lateral groupings and frameworks have also emerged in the last 10 to 15 years, aiming to unite like-minded nations in pursuit of greater defence integration. This trend further confirms that EU member states and partners recognise that, individually, their defence capabilities are insufficient to independently deliver most, if not all, defence missions and that collaboration and harmonisation are necessary. Under the leadership of French President Macron, for example, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) was launched in 2018 to be an agile, nonbinding, voluntary forum, among the most capable European governments willing to employ their military forces, complementary both to the EU (including PESCO) and NATO.88 The EI2 seeks to deepen cooperation in four areas: intelligence sharing and strategic foresight, planning and scenario development, support to operations and lessons learned.89 In practice, the initiative consists of meetings between the militaries of participating member states and periodically at the ministerial level.90 In Northern Europe, for example, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden take part in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a political and military framework that establishes cooperation in five areas: capabilities, armament, human resources and education, training and exercises as well as operations. The aim of NORDEFCO is to increase interoperability between those five members, develop a common understanding in these areas and optimise the use of their resources based on their common strategic culture.91 In addition, members of the Northern Group, including 12 countries bordering on the Baltic or North Sea, have been working to deepen regional defence and security cooperation including on information sharing, exercises and military mobility.92

C

### Agent CPs Bad

#### Agent CPs are a Voting Issue –

a) Topic education – agency debates are not grounded in the resolution – kills debate about military presence.

b) Aff ground – moots the 1AC and makes it impossible to garner offense – they open the floodgates for an infinite number of unpredictable counterplans

c) Read the CP as a DA – solves their offense

### International Fiat Bad

#### International Fiat is a voting issue –

--Not an opportunity cost – the judge is the US – logical decision making is the portable impact of debate

--CP justifies infinite intrinsicness because it expands the ambit of the judge – means we get to permute their DAs

--Fairness – impossible to research every possible actor – kills clash. And pressure CPs and international DAs solve their offense